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TREATMENT OF DEBTORS
0. JOHN ROCGE*
Debtors in Default, a four year study of consumer credit which
was released in July, 1971, berated courts for acting as collection
agents for creditors rather than administering justice in this type of
debtor-creditor dispute.' Based on interviews with 1,331 debtors in de-
fault in New York, Detroit, Philadelphia and Chicago, the study con-
cluded that the failure of the debtor to get a fair hearing in court
was a major injustice in the credit system. Professor Caplovitz, direc-
tor of the study, was quoted as saying:
At least 20 per cent of all default debtors interviewed had valid
defenses based on their creditors' failure to live up to their part of
the original bargain. If properly represented with legal counsel, un-
doubtedly many other debtors would be found to have valid defenses,.
Numerous remedies and tactics enable creditors to deprive debtors
of their liberty or property without due process of the law. This article
examines: (I) the basic requirements of the due process clause; and
(II) current methods of dealing with debtors. Part II focuses on court
decisions which have delineated the rights of debtors, and presents
arguments which attorneys may use when statutes and case law do not
adequately protect the debtor-client.
I. THE DuE PROCESS REQUIREMENT
Counsel representing individuals who are over their heads in debt,
and who are unable to secure relief under existing statutory provisions
and case law, should turn to the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment as to federal action: "No person shall . ..be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.. ."; and to the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment as
to state action: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
* Member, New York Bar. A.B., University of Illinois, 1922; LL.B., 1925; S.J.D.,
Harvard University, 1931.
1. The study was financed by the Urban Center at Columbia University and the
Federal Office of Economic Opportunity and was under the direction of Professor David
Caplovitz, author of a 1963 book on consumers entitled, The Poor Pay More.
2. As quoted in Gansberg, Courts Are Held Creditors' Allies, N.Y. Times, July
19, 1971, at 17, col. 3.. ..
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its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." These clauses are
instruments for effecting social change through law.8 Moreover, they
are part of a legal system which has a continuous history of almost
eight centuries.
A. The History of Due Process
The history of due process dates back to 1178 when Henry II
appointed five judges for the whole kingdom and told them "to do
right judgment,"' 4 to the present time. After this appointment, there
was sufficient legal development so that a generation later when his
son John misused his powers the result was the Magna Charta. King
John promised his barons:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled,
or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or [per legem ter-
rae] by the law of the land.5
3. See, e.g., Rogge, A Technique for Change, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 481 (1963);
Rogge, Williams v. Florida: End of a Theory (pts. 1-2), 16 VILL. L. Rav. 411, 607
(1971).
Although there is no equal protection clause in the Fifth Amendment, the Court
has used the due process clause from time to time to achieve equal protection results.
For instance, in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court under the due
process clause of the fifth amendment outlawed segregation in the public schools of
the District of Columbia, a result which it reached in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as
to public schools in the states. Chief Justice Warren, for a unanimous Court, said in
Bolling:
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools. The legal problem in the District of Columbia is somewhat different,
however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Co-
lumbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal pro-
tection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness,
are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and,
therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.
But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process.
347 U.S. at 498-99.
Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan joined in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-87 n.1 (1965),
pointed out that in this case the Court "derived an equal protection principle from that
Amendment's Due Process Clause."
4. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 482 (Douglas gen. ed. 1953). In the
years 1176-1178, Henry II instituted a permanent court of professional judges. At first
he divided the kingdom into six regions and appointed three judges for each region,
but this proved too cumbersome. He then appointed five judges for the whole kingdom.
5. W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 375 (2d ed. 1914).
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In the course of time the concept "law of the land" came also to
mean due process of law. King John's successors confirmed and reissued
the Magna Charta, sometimes repeatedly. Edward III (1327-1377), in
addition to his frequent confirmations of the Magna Charta, in 1354
further provided
[t]hat no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out
of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor
put to Death, without being brought in answer [par due proces de lei]
by due Process of Law.6
Thus the phrase, "due process of law," came into being.
Coke equated the two: "[B]y the law of the land (that is, to speak
it once for all) by the due course, and process of law."71 In this country,
we have made the same identification. Our earlier state constitutions
usually used the phrase, "by the law of the land."8 In the Dartmouth
College v. Woodward,9 Daniel Webster identified the law of the land
provision in the New Hampshire Constitution with due process:
One prohibition is, "that no person shall be . .. deprived of his life,
liberty, or estate, but by judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
. . . Have the plaintiffs lost their franchises by "due course and
process of law"? . . . By the law of the land is most dearly intended,
the general law .... The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his
life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the
general rules which govern society.10
Similarly, the Supreme Court equated the due process clause with
6. 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354).
7. 2 Inst. *46. See also 2 id at *50. His reference in the latter place to 37 Edw.
3, c. 8 (1363) is to A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel, 37 Edw. 3, c. 18 (1363).
8. E.g., DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1792) ("unless by the judgment of his peers or
the law of the land"); ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (1818) ("but by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land") ; I. CONST. Declaration of Rights art. XXI (1776) ("by
the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the Land"); MAss. CONST. Declaration
of Rights art. XII (1780) ("but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land"); N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1821) ("unless by the law of the land, or the
judgment of his peers"); N.C. CONST. Declaration of Rights § XII (1776) ("but by
the law of the land"); PA. CONST., Declaration of Rights § IX (1776) ("except by the
laws of the land, or the judgment of his peers"); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1790)
("unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land"); S.C. CONST. art. 41
(1778) ("but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land"); S.C. CONST.
art. I, § 14 (1868) ("but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land"); VT.
CONST. ch. I, § 11 (1786) ("except by the laws of the land, or the judgment of his
peers"); VA. CONST., Bill of Rights § 8 (1776) ("except by the law of the land or the
judgment of his peers").
9. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
10. Id. at 561, 581.
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the law of the land in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
ment Co.,11 its first major decision under the due process clause of the
fifth amendment:
The words, "due process of law," were undoubtedly intended to
convey the same meaning as the words, "by the law of the land," in
Magna Carta. Lord Coke in his commentary on those words (2 Inst.
50), says they mean due process of law. The constitutions which have
been adopted by the several States before the formation of the fed-
eral constitution, following the .language of the great charter more
closely, generally contained the words, "but by the judgment of his
peers, or the law of the land."' 2
B. Due Process Today
In Fuentes v. Shevin,13 decided on June 12, 1972, the Supreme
Court noted that
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due
process has been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must be notified." Baldwin v. Hale .... It is equally fundamental
that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard "must be
granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Arm-
strong v. Manzo .... 14
Keeping the history and current meaning of due process in mind,
the focus of this article shifts to examine the remedies used by creditors
against defaulting debtors. Although some of these remedies have been
severely weakened by recent court decisions, others continue to impose
severe burdens on the unfortunate debtor.
11. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
12. Id. at 276. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908), the Court
through Justice Moody explained:
There are certain general principles well settled, however, which narrow
the field of discussion and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These
principles grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts
on the authority of Coke, that the words "due process of law" are equivalent
in meaning to the words "law of the land," contained in . . . [the] Magna
Carta ....
In a yet later case, Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1926), the Court
said: "What it [due process clause] does require is that state action, whether through
one agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions and not in-
frequently are designated as 'law of the land.'"
13. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
14. Id. at 80.
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II. THE TREATMENT OF DEBTORS
Current methods of dealing with defaulting debtors can be classi-
fied as follows: A. Deprivations of Liberty; B. Deprivations of Prop-
erty; C. "Sewer Service" As a Procedural Deprivation; and D. Cognovit
Notes.
A. Deprivations of Liberty
1. Mesne Arrest. In In re Harris,'5 Chief Justice Traynor, speak-
ing for the California Supreme Court, held that California statutes16
which authorize the arrest and imprisonment of a defendant in a civil
action on an ex parte application of the plaintiff violate due process:
A defendant who is deprived of his liberty by civil process is as
much entitled to due process of law as a defendant who is deprived of
his liberty because he is charged with crime. The mesne process of
civil arrest without opportunity to be heard with the assistance of coun-
sel is not due process.17
2. Imprisonment for Debt. An ancient but obsolete practice is im-
prisonment for debt. Over three decades ago, at a 1939 session of the
Maine legislature, the late Senator Gail Laughlin of Portland, a promi-
nent women's suffrage leader, stamped her foot on the floor and ex-
claimed, "I thought that imprisonment for debt went out with the
writings of Charles Dickens."' 8 But imprisonment for debt is still with
us, and has been with us for seven centuries.'9 Although imprisonment
15. 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968).
16. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE §§ 478-504 (West 1954).
17. 69 Cal. 2d at 491, 446 P.2d at 152, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 344. But cf. Atlas Corp.
v. DeVilliers, 447 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933 (1972),
where the tenth circuit sustained a civil contempt fine which the debtor was ordered
to pay in reduction of the judgment against him or be committed to jail until the fine
was paid.
18. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1970, at 47, col. 1.
19. Perhaps the earliest of the English statutes relating to imprisonment for debt
was the Statute of Marlborough, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23 (1267) (repealed), which provided:
That if Bailiffs, which ought to make account to their Lords, do withdraw
themselves, and have no Lands nor Tenements whereby they may be dis-
trained; then they shall be attached by their Bodies, so that the Sheriff, in
whose Bailiwick they be found, shall cause them to come to make their Account.
The reigns of Edward I (1277-1307) and Edward III (1327-1377) witnessed gradual
expansions on the Statute of Marlborough. See, e.g., Statute of Westminster the Second,
13 Edw. 1, Stat. 1, c. 11 (1285) (repealed); Statute of Merchants, also known as the
Statute of Acton Burnel, 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 3, c. 1 (1285) (repealed); Statute of Purveyors,
25 Edw. 3, Stat. 5, c. 17 (1350) (repealed).
In earlier times, abuses inflicted by creditors and the connivings of sheriffs added
to the woes of debtors. Moreover, the courts showed little sympathy, if Justice Hyde's
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for a civil debt is an anachronistic as lopping off a hand for theft or, un-
der the Assize of Northhampton (1176) ,20 a hand and a foot for forgery
or arson, many states still have legislation on the books providing for
imprisonment for debt.21 The Constitution of the State of California
makes provision by way of exceptions for imprisonment for debt in
civil actions involving fraud and wilfull tort:
No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, on
mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud, nor in civil action for
dictum in Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781 (K.B. 1663), accurately portrays the
judiciary's sentiments:
If a man be taken in execution and lie in prison for debt, neither the
plaintiff at whose suit he is arrested, nor the sheriff who took him, is bound
to find him meat, drink or clothes . . .; but he must live on his own, or on
the charity of others, and if no man will relieve him, let him die in the name
of God, says the law ... and so say I.
Id. at 786.
20. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUasENTs 411 (Douglas, gen. ed. 1953).
21. See Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MicH. L. REv. 24 (1926); Parnass, Im-
prisonment for Civil Obligations in Illinois, 15 ILL. L. Rev. 559 (1921); Note, Present
Status of Execution Against the Body of the Judgment Debtor, 42 IowA L. tev. 306
(1957). For a recent illustrative case, see Carter v. Lynch, 429 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1970).
The applicable federal statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2007 (1964):
Imprisonment for debt.
(a) A person shall not be imprisoned for debt on a writ of execution
or other process issued from a court of the United States in any State wherein
imprisonment for debt has been abolished. All modifications, conditions, and
restrictions upon such imprisonment provided by State law shall apply to any
writ of execution or process issued from a court of the United States in accord-
ance with the procedure applicable in such State.
(b) Any person arrested or imprisoned in any State on a writ of execu-
tion or other process issued from any court of the United States in a civil
action shall have the same jail privileges and be governed by the same regula-
tions as persons confined in like cases on process issued from the courts of such
State. The same requirements governing discharge as are applicable in such
State shall apply. Any proceedings for discharge shall be conducted before a
United States commissioner for the judicial district wherein the defendant is
held.
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 64:
At the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies
providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satis-
faction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available
under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the state
in which the district court is held, existing at the time the remedy is sought,
subject to the following qualifications: (1) any existing statute of the United
States governs to the extent to which it is applicable; (2) the action in which
any of the foregoing remedies is used shall be commenced and prosecuted or,
if removed from a state court, shall be prosecuted after removal, pursuant
to these rules. The remedies thus available include arrest, attachment, garnish-
ment, replevin, sequestration, and other corresponding or equivalent remedies,
however designated and regardless of whether by state procedure the remedy
is ancillary to an action or must be obtained by an independent action.
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torts, except in cases of willful injury to person or property; and no
person shall be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace.22
Section 479 of the Code of Civil Procedure23 prescribes the instances
in which a defendant may be arrested on mesne process; section 682 (3)
provides that if the writ of execution
be against the person of the judgment debtor, it must require such offi-
cer to arrest such debtor and commit him to the jail of the county
until he pay the judgment with interest, or be discharged according
to law;
and section 715 deals with arrest on supplementary proceedings. 24
Lawyers for defendants facing body execution, if they have not
obtained relief on a state level should seek relief in the federal courts
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.25 Recently,
22. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 15 (1849); cf. Ex parte Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 193
P.2d 734 (1948).
23. CAL. Crv. PRO. CoD § 479 (West 1954).
24. Section 861 of the Code of Civil Procedure exempted females from civil arrest
in actions in justices' courts, but this section was repealed in 1933. For a case holding
a woman subject to civil arrest, see Burlingame v. Traeger, 101 Cal. App. 365, 281 P.
1051 (1929).
25. In seeking due process relief one of the threshold questions will be the choice
of court, federal or state. Since federal constitutional questions are involved, counsel's
first thought of a forum should be the federal courts.
In federal habeas corpus cases on behalf of state prisoners, one must first exhaust
state court remedies; but in other cases this would not be necessary. In the words of
the three-judge federal district court in Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1054 (N.D.
Ga. 1970), involving the right of a woman to an abortion: "[T]here is no requirement
that a litigant in federal court exhaust state judicial remedies, where he is asserting a
claim in proceedings other than habeas corpus involving a subject over which the
federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction."
However, just as the Burger Court will place more restrictions on the rights of
defendants than did the Warren Court, so the Burger Court, in the area of concurrentjurisdiction in the state and federal courts, will be more insistent than was the Warren
Court in having aggrieved persons seek relief in the state courts first. In Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), where the Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute
which permitted the posting of an individual as an excessive drinker without a hearing,
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Blackmun dissented on the ground that
the individual should have gone to the state courts first. In a total of six cases in
which counsel had sought relief in three-judge federal district courts-three obscenity
cases, Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971),
rev'g in part, vacated and remanded to Delta Book Distributing, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F.
Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971), vacated
and remanded to 306 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1969); two sedition cases, Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); and a case in-
volving an Illinois intimidation statute, Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971)-the Court
in February 1971 told counsel to raise their federal constitutional points in state court
trials, unless there were "extraordinary circumstances" or the threat of "irreparable
injury" or the danger of suffering "irreparable damages." See also Shaw v. Garrison,
328 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971), where the court found special circumstances. Never-
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in Desmond v. Hachey,26 consolidated class actions brought by certain
judgment debtors, the Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., obtained an
opinion from a federal three-judge district court that a section of the
Maine Debtor Disclosure Law27 which permits the arrest and incarcera-
tion, without a hearing, of a judgment debtor who has failed to obey
a subpoena for his appearance and examination at a disclosure hearing,
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
court noted:
During the last three years the two disclosure commissioners who
are defendants in this proceeding issued a total of 966 disclosure
subpoenas and 470 capiases to incarcerate, of which 367 were for
failure of the debtor to appear and 103 for his failure to obtain the
benefit of the poor debtor oath. A total of 179 debtors spent 1,754
days in debtors' prison pursuant to capiases to incarcerate in the two
counties involved in this litigation.2 8
In Gotthilf v. Sills,29 some creditors obtained a New York court
order providing that execution be issued against the person of the de-
fendant without notice to him. The order for body execution was
under a default judgment in a civil action. The order was obtained
pursuant to section 764 of the New York Civil Practice Act (CPA) ,0
which provided for body execution in the discretion of the court "where
the plaintiff's right to arrest the defendant depends upon the nature
of the action."'31
theless, counsel will persist in seeking better treatment for debtors, in the federal courts
if they can, under the due process and equal protection clauses, for it is in these
areas that the Burger Court will surpass the Warren Court, just as future courts will
surpass the Burger Court. The forceful presentations of counsel of the due process
and equal protection claims of their clients will compel this. Indeed, in some due process
and equal protection cases, the Burger Court has already gone beyond the Warren
Court.
26. 315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me. 1970).
27. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3505 (1964).
28. 315 F. Supp. at 331 n.6.
29. 375 U.S. 79 (1963).
30. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 764 (Thompson 1939).
31. Id. Under section 826 of the New York Civil Practice Act, such arrest may
occur in ten instances:
1. To recover a fine or penalty.
2. To recover damages for personal injury.
3. To recover damages for an injury to property, including the wrongful
taking, detention or conversion of personal property.
4. To recover damages for breach of a promise to marry.
5. To recover damages for misconduct or neglect in office, or in a pro-
fessional employment.
6. To recover damages for fraud, or deceit.
7. To recover a chattel where it. is alleged in the complaint that the
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On September 1, 1963, the Civil Practice Act was superseded by
a new Civil Practice Law and Rules, 32 and the cross-references table
from the Civil Practice Act to the Civil Practice Law and Rules indi-
cates that section 764 has been omitted. However, one is also instructed
therein to compare sections 6101 and 6111 of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules, and section 6111 provides for body arrest as a "provisional
remedy," whatever that may mean within the framework of the new
section, "in the discretion of the court, without notice, before or after
service of summons and at any time before or after judgment."33 Ap-
parently, the framers of the new Civil Practice Law and Rules intended
to eliminate body execution. However, they were unsuccessful, and in
New York a judgment debtor could still be jailed merely because he
owed a civil debt.
The debtor in Gotthilf petitioned the Federal Supreme Court for
certiorari on the sole ground that section 764 of the New York Civil
Practice Act, as applied to enforce collection of a debt, violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although certiorari was
granted3 4 the Court thereafter dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted on the ground that the petitioner had not exhausted his state
court remedies.35 The petitioner then attempted to exhaust his state
court remedies, found himself foreclosed, and again petitioned the
Supreme Court on the same ground. This time the Court denied
certiorari.3 6 In 1964, New York limited arrest after judgment to the
ne exeat situations in section 6101 (2) of the Civil Practice Law and
Rules.37
chattel or a part thereof has been concealed, removed or disposed of so that
it cannot be found or taken by the sheriff ....
8. To recover for money received . . . [as a result of embezzlement or
fraudulent misapplication by a public official or other fiduciary].
9. To recover.. . [public funds converted by the defendant].
10. In an action upon contract, express or implied where it is alleged
in the complaint that the defendant was guilty of a fraud in . . . incurring
the liability, or that, since the making of the contract . . . he has removed
or disposed of his property with intent to defraud ....
32. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw (McKinney 1963).
33. Id. § 6111.
34. Gotthilf v. Sills, 372 U.S. 957 (1963).
35. 375 U.S. 79 (1963). On the need to exhaust state court remedies, see the
discussion in supra note 25.
36. Gotthilf v. Sills, 376 U.S. 964 (1964).
37. N.Y. Snss. LAws 1964, ch. 405. In Wright v. Crawford, 401 S.W.2d 47 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1966), the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a defendant who was subject
to imprisonment under a civil judgment was entitled to a hearing upon the issue of his
claimed indigence and, if he should be adjudged indigent, to appointed counsel for
his appeal as well as a free record and transcript.
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3. Alimony Jails. Imprisonment for failure to make alimony pay-
ments is even more prevalent than imprisonment for debt. Indeed,
while provisions for body execution are decreasing, those aimed at jail-
ing a delinquent husband have been increasing. For instance, in abol-
ishing imprisonment for debt, Maryland not only made an exception
for alimony decrees, but on two occasions enlarged it. Originally ali-
mony was judicially defined as not constituting a debt. 8s In 1950 this
exception was codified and enlarged by equating an agreement for sup-
port or alimony which is approved by a court of competent jurisdiction
with a court decree. 39 A 1962 amendment included support of an ille-
gitimate child or children. 40
Three of our most populous states, California, New York and Illi-
nois, still send individuals to jail for failure to pay alimony. Prior to
September 1, 1963, a husband in default on alimony payments could be
jailed under section 1172 of the New York Civil Practice Act.41 Since
that time the same result is reached under section 245 of the Domestic
Relations Law.4 In California, imprisonment depends upon whether
the husband's lawyer has been able to obtain an integrated agreement
with the wife providing in an inseparably interwoven fashion for both
support and a division of property.43 The California Supreme Court has
held that the obligation of a husband to support his wife is not a "debt"
within the meaning of the constitutional provision against imprison-
ment for debt.44 But if his lawyer has been able to obtain an integrated
agreement, the payments provided for by the agreement may not be
enforced by contempt proceedings. 45
Attorneys for husbands who are in danger of incarceration for
38. See discussion in Speckler v. Speckler, 256 Md. 635, 636, 261 A.2d 466, 467
(1970).
39. MD. CONST. art. III,§ 38 (1950).
40. MD. CONST. art. III,§ 38 (1962), amending MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (1867).
41. Civil Practice Act of May 20, 1920, ch. 925, § 1172, [1920] N.Y. LAws 397
(repealed 1963).
42. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 245 (McKinney 1964). For a case ruling on affidavits,
see Casola v. Casola, 235 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. 1962). For an Illinois case see
Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 93 Ill. App. 2d 126, 235 N.E.2d 664 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1117 (1969). Subsequently, the courts denied habeas corpus relief. People
ex rel. Kazubowski v. Ray, 48 Ill. 2d 413, 272 N.E.2d 225, petition for cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 818 (1971).
43. See generally Comment, Divorce Agreements in California, 2 U.C.L.A.L. Rv.
233 (1955).
44. Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 733, 72 P.2d 868 (1937).
45. Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 509, 310 P.2d 634 (1957); see Com-
ment, Enforcement of Divorce Decrees and Settlements by Contempt and Imprisonment
in California, 9 HASTINGs L.J. 57 (1957); 10 STAN. L. Rev. 321 (1958).
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failing to make alimony payments should argue that such incarcera-
tion would be violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Let the attorneys for wives seize the available assets and
earnings of their clients' husbands, but not their bodies. Courts should
be asked to reexamine the concept of contempt of court and to exclude
from this concept those cases where the alleged contempt consists of a
failure to comply with an order to pay money.
B. Deprivations of Property
1. Attachment. In Randone v. Appellate Department4" a unani-
mous California Supreme Court invalidated an attachment statute
which permitted prejudgment attachment without notice or hearing
of any property, earnings excepted, in a contract action. Speaking for
the court, Justice Tobriner concluded that this statute was in violation
of due process, since it permitted the seizure of the necessities of life
without notice or hearing or a showing of extraordinary circumstances.
Justice Tobriner began his opinion with this paragraph:
For more than a century California creditors have enjoyed the
benefits of a variety of summary prejudgment remedies, and, until
recently, the propriety of such procedures has gone largely unchal-
lenged. In June 1969, however, the United States Supreme Court
in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.... concluded that a Wisconsin
prejudgment wage garnishment statute violated a debtor's right to
procedural due process, by sanctioning the "taking" of his property
without affording him prior notice and hearing. The force of the
constitutional principles underlying the Sniadach decision has brought
the validity of many of our state's summary prejudgment remedies into
serious question.4 7
However, if the attachment is of real estate and there is no depri-
vation of the use, enjoyment or right to transfer, the result may well
be otherwise. In Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick48 a federal district
court in Connecticut refused to apply Sniadach to a prejudgment real
estate attachment.
2. Garnishment. Garnishment is another ancient remedy which
can be attacked through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.49 the Supreme Court
held that Wisconsin's garnishment procedure, which resulted in an
46. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
47. Id. at 540, 488 P.2d at 14, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
48. 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971).
49. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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interim freezing of wages without a chance to be heard, "violates the
fundamental principles of due process."5 Justice Harlan concurred on
the ground that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits state
action by norms of "fundamental fairness" whose content in any
given instance is to be judicially derived not alone, as my colleague
believes it should be, from the specifics of the Constitution, but also,
as I believe, from concepts which are part of the Anglo-American
legal heritage-not, as my Brother BLACK continues to insist, from the
mere predilections of individual judges.51
Justice Black, who wanted to bind the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the specifics of the Federal Bill of Rights,
found himself in dissent:
This holding savors too much of the "Natural Law," "Due Process,"
"Shock-the-conscience" test of what is constitutional for me to agree
to the decision....
[My Brother HARLAN'S "Anglo-American legal heritage" is no
more definite than the "notions of justice of English-speaking peoples"
or the shock-the-conscience test. All of these so-called tests represent
nothing more or less than an implicit adoption of a Natural Law con-
cept which under our system leaves to judges alone the power to decide
what the Natural Law means. 5
2
After Sniadach, in the words of Justice Stewart in a footnote to the
Court's opinion in Fuentes v. Shevin,53 "summary prejudgment reme-
dies have come under constitutional challenge throughout the country."
More specifically, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Larson v.
Fetherston5 4 ruled all prejudgment garnishments unconstitutional,
whatever the nature of the garnished funds; the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc." invalidated
Minnesota's garnishment statute; the California Supreme Court in
McCallop v. Carberry"6 voided that state's wage garnishment statute;
a three-judge federal district court in Alabama in McMeans v. Schwartz57
declared a portion of the Alabama Code to be "in violation of the
50. Id. at 342.
51. Id. at 342-43.
52. Id. at 350-51.
53. 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972).
54. 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
55. 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
56. 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970); accord, Cline v.
Credit Bureau, 1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970).
57. 330 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
56
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fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution insofar as it
allows garnishments to be issued prior to a final judgment unless there is
a showing that such garnishment is necessary because of extraordinary
circumstances"; 5 a three-judge federal district court in Georgia in
Reeves v. Motor Contract Company of Georgia59 held a proviso of the
Georgia Code violative of due process, to the extent that it authorizes
garnishment of wages prior to judgment on the merits; and another
such court in Georgia ruled similarly as to prejudgment garnishment
of funds set aside for college tuition in Aaron v. Clark.60 In the last
case the court reasoned that funds set aside for college tuition are a
specialized type of property, the summary seizure of which could and
did impose a great hardship on the alleged debtor.
Despite Sniadach, a three-judge federal district court in Con-
necticut in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.61 refused to con-
sider the constitutionality of Connecticut prejudgment garnishment
and attachment statutes "for lack of Civil Rights Act jurisdiction." 62 The
suit was brought under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1983).
But the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. Justice
Stewart pointed out:
Because of the extrajudicial nature of Connecticut garnishment, an
injunction against its maintenance is not, therefore, barred by the
terms of § 2283. In light of this conclusion, we need not decide
whether § 1983 is an exception to § 2283 "expressly authorized by
Act of Congress." We have explicitly left that question open in other
decisions. And we may put it to one side in this case because the state
act that the federal court was asked to enjoin was not a proceeding "in
a State court" within the meaning of § 2283. 68
58. Id, at 1400.
59. 324F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
60. 342 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ga. 1972). In Webster Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 344 F.
Supp. 1136 (D. Ariz. 1972), the court invalidated the prejudgment garnishment pro-
visions of Arizona statutes; in Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. II. 1972), a
three-judge federal district court held that the Illinois garnishment statute, when in-
voked to satisfy a judgment obtained by confession under another Illinois statutory
provision, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
61. 318 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Conn. 1970), reo'd, 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
62. 318 F. Supp. at 1114.
63. 405 U.S. at 556. Subsequently, in Mitchurn v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972),
the Court decided that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was within the exception of 28 U.S.C. §2283.
Justice Stewart wrote the Court's opinion. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion
in which Justices White and Blackmun joined, cautioned:
Therefore on remand in this case, it seems to me the District Court, before
reaching a decision on the merits of petitioner's claim, should properly consider
whether general notions of equity or principles of federalism, similar to those
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As in Fuentes v. Shevin,6 4 Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined.
3. Replevin. Another ancient remedy which is subject to abuse at
the hands of creditors is that of replevin. So far as debtors are con-
cerned, this remedy has undergone a marked change for the worse over
the centuries. As Justice Stewart explained in Fuentes v. Shevin:5
Although these prejudgment replevin statutes are descended from
the common law replevin action of six centuries ago, they bear very
little resemblance to it. Replevin at common law was an action for the
return of specific goods wrongfully taken or "distrained." Typically,
it was used after a landlord (the "distrainor") had seized possessions
from a tenant (the "distrainee") to satisfy a debt allegedly owed. If
the tenant then instituted a replevin action and posted security,
the landlord could be ordered to return the property at once, pending
a final judgment in the underlying action."
Counsel for overburdened debtors whose chattels have been seized
by writs of replevin should think in terms of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
In two recent cases, Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., Inc."'
and Blair v. Pitchess,6s the courts invalidated replevin provisions. In
Laprease the Onondaga Neighborhood Legal Services, Inc., obtained a
ruling from a federal three-judge court in New York that New York's
replevin provisions,
permitting the prejudgment seizure of chattels by the plaintiff in a
replevin action without an order of a judge or of a court of competent
jurisdiction, are unconstitutional in that they violate the search and
seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the provisions further
violate the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 9
invoked in Younger, prevent the issuance of an injunction against the state
"nuisance abatement" proceedings in the circumstances of this case.
Id. at 244.
64. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 78-79.
67. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
68. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). Cf. Hammond v.
Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn.
1971).
69. 315 F. Supp. at 725.
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-In Blair, which involved the replevin provisions of the California
claim and delivery law, the California Supreme Court reasoned:
However substantially claim and delivery procedure may protect
the creditor's interest and indirectly promote the state's interest in
business and commerce, it seems to us that such advantages are far
outweighed by its detrimental effect upon those whose goods are seized.
The removal of personal property, like the garnishment of wages, in
many cases imposes tremendous hardship on the defendant and his
family and gives the plaintiff unwarranted leverage. The declaration
of one of the deputy sheriffs of the County of Los Angeles discloses
that the "great majority of items repossessed at residential locations are
appliances such as television sets, refrigerators, stoves, and sewing ma-
chines, and furniture of all kinds." The seizure of such goods "may as
i practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall. Where the
taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument
to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing [citation] this [claim
and delivery procedure] violates the fundamental principles of due
process." (Fns. omitted.) (Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp ..... ) 7
In a footnote the Court answered the argument of the defendants
that the age of the remedy should validate it:
Defendant's contention that the Fifth Amendment could not
have been intended to invalidate a remedy which was in common use
at the time that amendment was adopted and which had its roots in
the Statute of Marlbridge . . . is also answered by Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court in Sniadach: "The fact that a procedure would
pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary
protection to all property in its modem forms." . . . Garnishment
also had origins in medieval England and was in use in colonial
America... ; yet as the sentence quoted above indicates, the Su-
preme Court found that the long history of that remedy did not en-
sure its present compliance with due process requirements.71
But in two later cases, Fuentes v. Faircloth72 and Epps v. Cortese,7 3
federal three-judge district courts sustained replevin provisions of the
states of Florida and Pennsylvania. In Fuentes, Economic Opportunity
Legal Services represented the plaintiffs; and in Epps, Community
Legal Services. However, the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin 74
70. 5 Cal. 3d at 279, 486 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
71. Id.
72. 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972).
73. 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), vacated sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972).
74. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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vacated the judgments in these two cases and held that the Florida: and
Pennsylvania replevin provisions were invalid under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment because they denied the right to a
hearing before chattels were taken from the possessors. Justice Stewart
wrote for the majority:
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then,
it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation
can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an individual's possessions
can be returned to him if it was unfairly or mistakenly taken in the
first place. Damages may even be awarded to him for the wrongful
deprivation. But no later hearing and no damage award can undo the
fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of proce-
dural due process has already occurred. "This Court has not... em-
braced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be
undone." ...
We hold that the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin
provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law
insofar as they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before
chattels are taken from their possessor. 5
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun dissented.
Justice White wrote the dissenting opinion; he would have vacated the
judgments and instructed the courts below to reconsider these cases "in
the light of the principles announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) ; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66; Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77; and Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82."76
4. Summary Repossession. Repossession differs from replevin,
garnishment, distraint or attachment in that it is a self-help remedy.
Nevertheless, in Adams v. Egley77 a federal district court struck down
the provisions of the California Commercial Code for the repossession
and disposition of collateral by a secured party after default by the
debtor. District Judge Leland C. Nielsen, although not greatly in
sympathy with the result that he reached, nevertheless reasoned:
If the policy underlying the decision in Sniadach is to provide some
extra modicum of legal protection to those who live on the lower
economic margins of our society, it would be illogical for the courts
75. Id. at 81-82, 96.
76. Id. at 98.
77. 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). But cf. Jernigan v. Economy Exterminating
Co., 327 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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to be dissuaded from applying that policy by the presence of standard-
form contracts which often operate most harshly on the poor. See
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 121 U.S. App.D.C. 315,
350 F.2d 445 (1965). If the provisions of a contract can legitimize
summary repossession, wage garnishment might then be valid on the
same theory, as long as a private agreement could be shown. This
would fly in the face of the reasoning in Sniadach, and is rejected by
this court.78
5. Landlords and Tenants. In Santiago v. McElroy79 a federal
three-judge district court in Pennsylvania held that distress sales under
the distraint procedures of the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant
Act, "insofar as they do not follow a hearing of some sort before the
tenant is deprived of his property, violate the fundamental principles
of due process."8 0 The landlords argued "that distress is ancient, and
that the landlord-tenant relation has been given special treatment since
early common law," to which the court responded: "And even if dis-
tress sales were to qualify as a time-honored procedure, it is also true
that the blessing of age wears out."'
' s
In Mihans v. Municipal Court 2 the court invalidated section 1166a
of the California Code of Civil Procedure on due process grounds, in-
sofar as it authorized the issuance of a prejudgment writ of possession
without a hearing. Thereafter section 1166a, which had been amended
in 1969 to provide for notice and a limited hearing, was amended still
further to provide for a broader hearing.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held in Harrington v. Har-
rington8s that a section of a Maine statute compelling an indigent de-
fendant in an eviction proceeding to recognize or give bond as a pre-
requisite to a hearing of her defense of title in herself, when because of
her poverty she was unable to do so, was a denial of equal protection;
and further held that another section, exacting security to maintain an
appeal, imposed an unconstitutional burden because of the defendant's
status as a poor person.
78. 338 F. Supp. at 621.
79. 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); accord, Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp.
528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971). In Gross
v. Fox, 41 U.S.L.W. 2043 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1972), a three-judge federal district court
held that a constable's entry upon a tenant's premises without the tenant's consent to
effect a distraint violated the fourth amendment.
80. 319 F. Supp. at 295.
81. Id.
82. 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970).
83. - Me. -- , 269 A.2d 310 (1970).
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The Supreme Court of Illinois in Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little 4 con-
cluded that section 18 of that state's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act,
insofar as it requires the furnishing of a bond as a prerequisite to a
tenant's appeal, violated the fourteenth amendment as well as provi-
sions of both the Illinois Constitution of 1870 and the Illinois Consti-
tution of 1970. The court also reached the conclusion that the landlord
was subject to an implied warranty of habitability.
In Hall v. Garson85 the Fifth Circuit decided that a Texas statute
which gives a landlord a lien on personal goods of tenants and author-
izes the landlord to enforce that lien by peremptory seizure of prop-
erty might be violative of due process.
The Georgia Supreme Court in Blocker v. Blackburn0 ruled that
the Georgia Distress Warrant Law "which permits household furniture
of the owner to be removed from his home and held by the levying
officer of the court without notice and without hearing deprives the
owner of his property without due process of law.' 87 But the same court
in State v. Sanks88 held that Georgia statutes which required a tenant
to post a bond as a condition precedent to filing a defense in a summary
dispossession proceeding and to pay double rent if he lost, did not vio-
late the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction,89 heard argument at its 1969 Term, and
restored the case to the calendar for reargument at its 1970 Term. 0
After the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, the Georgia
General Assembly repealed virtually the entire statutory scheme that
governed the litigation, and replaced it with one that contains neither
the bond posting nor double rent requirement.91 Because of this, and
because the tenants had moved from the premises originally sought to
be recovered by their landlords, the Court dismissed the appeal and
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Subsequently, in Lindsey v. Normet92 the Court held that the
double bond requirement for an appeal in the Oregon Forcible Entry
and Wrongful Detainer Statute violated the equal protection clause of
84. 50 I1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
85. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
86. 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971).
87. Id. at -, 185 S.E.2d at 59.
88. 225 Ga. 88, 166 S.E.2d 19 (1969), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 144 (1971).
89. 395 U.S. 974 (1969).
90. 399 U.S. 922 (1970).
91. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-302 to 61-305 (Supp. 1970).
92. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
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the fourteenth amendment. Justice White wrote: "The discrimination
against the poor, who could pay their rent pending an appeal but can-
not post the double bond is particularly obvious." 93
However, in that case the Court also ruled that tenants did not
have any constitutional right to withhold rent payments from land-
lords who failed to make repairs. On this point, Justice White noted:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe and sani-
tary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that
document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a
particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy
the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease, with-
out the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the rele-
vant agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of ade-
quate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are
legislative, not judicial, functions. Nor should we forget that the
Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of private property
or the income therefrom.
94
Those representing tenants in this case had hoped to liberalize
landlord-tenant law through a Supreme Court decision, much as the
poor have used court decisions to win greater rights under the welfare
laws. In this regard, the Court disappointed them. Those who filed
briefs amicus curiae included: Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc.;
New Hampshire Legal Assistance; Memphis and Shelby County Legal
Services Ass'n., Inc.; Western Center on Law and Poverty; Legal Aid
Society of Louisville; Legal Aid Bureau, Inc.; Community Action for
Legal Services, Inc.; Allen County Legal Aid Society; and National
Legal Aid and Defender Association.
93. Id. at 79.
94. Id. at 74. In McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.I.
1972), Chief Judge Raymond J. Pettine of the Federal District Court in Rhode Island
enjoined a landlord of a federally assisted housing project from evicting tenants on
the expiration of their leases. The tenants claimed that they could not be evicted
without good cause and notice and an opportunity for a full, fair and impartial hearing
as to the existence of good cause. Judge Pettine reasoned:
The right to decent housing at a rent that can be afforded, the right not to
be uprooted, the right to stability as a participant in a particular community,
and the right to be left alone are all substantial personal rights involved in the
instant litigation....
Here, the balance of hardships weighs in plaintiffs' favor. At stake for these
tenants is decent housing at a rent they can afford and the stability of their
homelife. So long as University Heights continues to receive rent from plaintiffs,
the damage this landlord will suffer from issuance of a preliminary injunction
is minimal.
338 F. Supp. at 379, 382.
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6. Innkeeper's Lien. In Klim v. Jones95 a federal district court
in California held that a California statute which gave an innkeeper
a lien without provision for a hearing as a condition precedent, vio-
lated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. A federal district
court in Illinois ruled similarly in Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp.90
as to the Illinois Innkeepers' Lien Laws.
7. Bankruptcy Fees. Federal District Judge Anthony J. Travia in
Brooklyn ruled in In re Kras97 that indigents may file for bankruptcy
without paying the usual $50 filing fee. Judge Travia based his decision
on the due process clause of the fifth amendment which also serves
as an equal protection clause. He wrote:
This Court can only agree that a proper interpretation of Boddie
requires that, as applied to petitioner herein, the statutory requirement
of prepayment of a filing fee to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy vio-
lates his Fifth Amendment right of due process, including equal
protection.98
The Legal Aid Society represented the indigent. In February 1972 the
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.
95. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
96. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972). In Gray v. Whitmore, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1,
94 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1971), the court struck down so much of section 1174 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure as permitted a landlord to assert a lien upon his
tenant's furniture for amounts due under a lease.
97. 331 F. Supp. 1207 (B.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. juris. noted sub nom. United States
v. Kras, 405 U.S. 915 (1972); accord, In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Ore. 1971); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D.
Colo. 1971). Contra, In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 966 (1971). Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan dissented from the denial of
review in In re Garland and eight other cases in which indigents were denied access to
civil courts because of their poverty. Justice Black in his dissent commented:
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only
one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of
the States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be
denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot
pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney. Some
may sincerely believe that the decision in Boddie was far more limited in scope
-that is, applies only to divorce cases. Other people might recognize that this
constitutional decision will eventually extend to all civil cases but believe
that it can only be enforced slowly step by step, so that the country will have
time to absorb its full import. But in my judgment Boddie cannot and should
not be limited to either its facts or its language, and I believe there can be
no doubt that this country can afford to provide court costs and lawyers to
Americans who are now barred by their poverty from resort to the law for
resolution of their disputes.
403 U.S. at 955-56.
98. 331 F. Supp. at 1212.
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In O'Brien v. Trevethan,99 Connecticut District Judge T. Emmet
Clarie held that indigents do not have to pay the $10 filingfee for re-
view of orders denying them discharges. He reasoned:
The economic stability of an individual is generally regarded as
a matter of fundamental importance. The right of these plaintiffs to a
a fresh start in life through a discharge in bankruptcy is as significant
as the right to a divorce protected in Boddie.'0 0
C. Sewer Service: A Deprivation of Due Process
In New York City there is a practice, how widespread it is the
writer does not know, of obtaining default judgments against econom-
ically disadvantaged debtors by a process known as "sewer service"
whereby process servers prepare false affidavits or fail to make service.
In United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc.,011 Federal District Judge Mar-
vin E. Frankel of the Southern District of New York concluded that
the United States had standing to seek injunctive and other civil relief
against this practice. Judge Frankel held "that the United States may
maintain this action because it has standing to sue to end wide-
.spread deprivations (i.e., deprivations affecting many people) of prop-
erty through 'state action' without due process of law."' 10 2
D. Cognovit Notes
In some of the cases that we have considered, creditors have made
the point that debtors have waived their constitutional rights. However,
the courts have been almost as unwilling to find a waiver of such rights
in civil cases as in criminal cases. For instance, in Fuentes v. Shevin,10 3
involving Florida and Pennsylvania replevin provisions, the creditors
claimed that those who signed the conditional sales contracts involved
had waived their due process rights. The contract that Mrs. Fuentes
signed provided that "in the event of default of any payment or pay-
ments, Seller at its option may take back the merchandise." Pennsyl-
vania appellants signed contracts that provided that the seller "may
retake" or "repossess" the merchandise in the event of a "default in
any payment."' 0 4 Nevertheless, the Court refused to find a waiver.
Justice Stewart in the Court's opinion wrote:
99. 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972).-
100. Id. at 1032.
101. 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
102. Id. at 1299.
103. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
104. Id. at 94. ' : ." . ' .{
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The conditional sales contracts here simply provided that upon a
default the seller "may take back," ".may retake" or "may repossess"
merchandise. The contracts included nothing about the waiver of a
prior hearing. They did not indicate how or through what process-a
final judgment, self-help, prejudgment replevin with a prior hearing,
or prejudgment replevin without a prior hearing-the seller could
take back the goods. Rather, the purported waiver provisions here
are no more than a statement of the seller's right to repossession upon
occurrence of certain events. The appellees do not suggest that these
provisions waived the appellants' right to a full post-seizure hearing
to determine whether those events had, in fact, occurred and to con-
sider any other available defenses. By the same token, the language of
the purported waiver provisions did not waive the appellants' consti-
tutional right to a preseizure hearing of some kind.10 5
But in the case of a cognovit note the debtor expressly and spe-
cifically agrees to the entry of a judgment against him. Yet in Swarb v.
Lennox0 6 a federal three-judge district court in Pennsylvania held, with
reference to Pennsylvania residents whose incomes were under $10,000
and who had signed a confession of judgment clause in commercial and
financing transactions, that they did not intentionally waive known
rights and that therefore as to them, Pennsylvania's procedure for the
entry of confessed judgments violated due process. The court concluded:
After a careful examination of the record, we find that there was
no intentional waiver of a known right by members of the above class
in executing the confesssion of judgment clauses. The evidence indicates
that the debtors did not fully understand the rights which they were
relinquishing by signing these notes, that is, the right to have notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to judgment, the right to have
the burden of proving default rest upon the creditor before their prop-
erty could possibly be exposed to execution, and, finally, the right to
avoid the additional expense of attorney's fees and costs incident to
opening or striking off a confessed judgment under the above-de-
scribed Pennsylvania procedure. 107
One of the three judges concurred in part and dissented in part.
He dissented as to the limitation of relief to those earning less than
$10,000 annually. As part of their case, the plaintiffs introduced in
evidence a report by Professor Caplovitz entitled Consumers in
105. Id. at 95-96.
106. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), prob. juris, noted 401 U.S. 991 (1971),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
107. 314 F. Supp. at 1100.
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Trouble.08 In the words of Justice Blackmun in the Supreme Court's
opinion:
The plaintiffs also introduced in evidence by stipulation a pub-
lished report by David Caplovitz, Ph.D., Consumers in Trouble. This
was a 1968 study of confessed judgment debtors in four major Penn-
sylvania cities. It included 245 Philadelphia debtors. The study pur-
ported to show that 96% had annual incomes of less than $10,000,
and 56% less than $6,000; that only 30% had graduated from high
school; and that only 14% knew the contracts they signed contained
cognovit clauses. 09
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jursidiction.
But as was noted by Justice Blackmun,
the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office, apparently due to an in-
terim personnel change, no longer supports the position taken at the
trial by the city solicitor and the deputy attorney general and, not
choosing to pursue its customarily assumed duty to defend the Com-
monwealth's legislation, now joins the appellants in urging here that
the rules and statutes are facially invalid." 0
The Supreme Court thus ended up affirming the judgment of the three-
judge district court below.
A federal three-judge court in Delaware reached a similar result
in Osmund v. Spence."' The court ruled that the Delaware statutory
scheme permitting cognovit judgments was unconstitutional in failing
to provide for notice and a hearing preceding the entry of judgment,
thus affording no method of judicially determining whether a particu-
lar debtor had knowingly and intelligently signed the judgment note,
thereby waiving his fourteenth amendment rights. The Community
Legal Aid Society, Inc. of Wilmington represented some of the plaintiffs.
However, if the contracting parties to a cognovit note deal with
each other more or less as equals, the story may be otherwise. In D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., °- in which the Court granted certiorari on
the same day that it noted probable jurisdiction in Swarb v. Lennox," 3
the Court sustained the validity of a cognovit note authorized by Ohio
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law. But in one of its concluding comments in Overmyer, the Court
gave this caution as to the scope of its holding:
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts
of other cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion,
where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal conse-
quences may ensue." 4
CONCLUSION
As one surveys the course of the Burger Court, one is reminded,
albeit remotely, of what David Jardine wrote in comparing the rights
of deviants after the Restoration of the Stuarts (in the person of Charles
II in 1660) with those rights under the Commonwealth with Oliver
Cromwell, and before:
The law then for the first time became a protection to the sub-
ject against the power of the Crown; and so well considered and
substantial were the improvements then introduced, that they con-
tinued after the Restoration, and through the tumultuous and san-
guinary reign which succeeded it. Though the barriers were still
insufficient entirely to stop the encroachments of bad princes, encour-
aged and promoted by unprincipled judges, the administration of the
criminal law, even in the evil days of Charles II, was always better
than it had been before the Commonwealth; for the tide of improve-
ment, having once set in, steadily continued to flow, until at length the
increase of knowledge, and the power and proper direction of public
opinion, led to the final subjection of prerogative to law at the Revo-
lution of 1688.1 5
The tide of new rights for defendants having set in, the change
from the Warren Court to the Burger Court will not greatly impede it.
Individuals should, of course, meet their obligations, to them-
selves, to others, to the state, and to the world. But if an underdog has
made a bad bargain or is otherwise so financially over-committed as to
have no hope of paying his debts, we must give him relief. It is better
to have a few creditors who become somewhat leaner than many hope-
less debtors.
Those seeking to help overburdened debtors should bear in mind
the due process and equal protection clauses. These clauses are not a
panacea. However, if there are no other avenues that give relief to the
economically disadvantaged, these clauses may prove useful.
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